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BREAKING WINDOWS AS CORRECTIVE JUSTICE:
IMPURE RESISTANCE IN URBAN GHETTOS
Eric J. Miller*
TOMMIE SHELBY, DARK GHETTOS: INJUSTICE, DISSENT, AND REFORM (BELKNAP
PRESS 2016). PP. 352. HARDCOVER $29.95. PAPERBACK $19.95.

INTRODUCTION
In 2014, in Ferguson, Missouri, police officer Darren Wilson shot and killed Michael
Brown, an unarmed African American. There is a famous—or infamous—photograph
from the protests that depicts Edward Crawford, a man in a stars-and-stripes t-shirt
winding up to throw a tear gas canister, apparently at the police. On its face, this seems an
unlawful act. But is it an unjustified one? Is Crawford engaged in a morally or politically
justified act of resistance to the police (or the city or the state)? Is he a bystander, acting
to protect his fellow residents from wrongful police intimidation? Or is he engaged in a
morally and legally impermissible act of civil unrest?
At the very least, Crawford violates one social norm governing African American
interactions with the police. In encountering the police, and so the state, members of the
public are supposed to act in a deferential manner, even if the police act wrongfully in
initiating the encounter (their motive is just to harass the civilian) or in the manner they
conduct the encounter (they treat the civilian with contempt). Rather than acting on their
moral duty to confront wrongdoing, the public is required to reassure the police, through
their conduct and manner, that they recognize their subordinate status and the passivity it
entails.1
Nonetheless, the stakes in these encounters are not equally spread across the
community. The background matters: the police think some communities are more
accepting of their authority than others, and so are more willing to rely on the soft authority
of the uniform and the badge, rather than the hard authority of the nightstick and the gun.2
Socioeconomic elites are treated better than poor people of all races; African Americans,
whatever their class, are treated worse. While poor Whites outside the dark ghetto are

* Professor and Leo J. O’Brien Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. My thanks to Kimberly WestFaulcon and Justin Levitt for their helpful comments.
1. TOMMIE SHELBY, DARK GHETTOS: INJUSTICE, DISSENT, AND REFORM 57–58, 218, 221 (2016).
2. See JOSEPH S. NYE, THE POWERS TO LEAD (2008), for a comparison of soft power and hard power as
obverse tools for obtaining preferred outcomes.
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likely to face police harassment, 3 the police think they lack much soft authority in the
ghetto and are more inclined to use the hard authority of physical force when confronted
by dissent. Enforced passivity has a different cultural meaning for African Americans than
it does for many Whites.4 In that case, justice or self-respect and authority conflict in ways
that predictably lead to subordination and violence.
Such encounters violate corrective justice: harassment is a wrong against the civilian
that stands uncorrected.5 Complaining, however, would have no effect on correcting the
wrong and may even make it worse;6 there are strong consequentialist arguments that
resisting the police is not worth the candle. Nonetheless, deference to unjust demands has
an important moral cost. Civilians must participate in, rather than confront and resist, their
victimhood. They forgo (perhaps by design) a vital aspect of dignity or self-respect:
“recognizing oneself as a rational agent and a moral equal and valuing oneself
accordingly.”7
Crawford’s action upends this narrative. In throwing the canister, he rejects the selfabnegating stance of deference to unjust authority. Even if his act does not make the
situation more just, and even if his act is “impure” and can be understood in multiple,
conflicting ways, his act of protest—and riots and civic disruption more generally—is a
powerful expression of political resistance. Crawford asserts his moral agency in calling
the police to account as a political equal by forcing an encounter on the police: the police
cannot remain remote.8 Such confrontation may be the only way the police or the state are
forced to address, confront or acknowledge socially marginalized individuals when other
channels of communication are broken.
Tommie Shelby’s remarkable book, Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform,
deepens and broadens these important questions. Contrasting our usual civic norms, which
assume a background of a basically just society, with those of an unjust one, Shelby asks:
what are our civic obligations to each other? Our basic duty of justice—whether bystander,
perpetrator, or victim—requires us to call out and correct injustices. Shelby believes that
our civic claims on others have a different source than the duty of natural justice and
instead depend upon marshaling reciprocal obligations grounded in fairness and respect.
If we tolerate conditions that are so unfair and so categorically undermine the self-respect
of readily identifiable groups of people, then do we even have standing to call protesters
like Crawford to account, or to condemn his actions as morally or politically wrongful?
Shelby’s striking conclusion is that some societies place people in conditions so unjust that
they are not, in fairness, answerable to the rest of us for acts of resistance to their social,

3. See, e.g., P.A.J. WADDINGTON, POLICING CITIZENS: POLICE, POWER AND THE STATE 42 (1999) (arguing
that the police impose “[p]revailing social values . . . by routine harassment and intimidation”).
4. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 356 (1987) (suggesting that certain types of treatment “conveys a symbolic
message to which the culture attaches racial significance”).
5. SHELBY, supra note 1, at 12–13, 25.
6. Id. at 263.
7. Id. at 98.
8. Id. at 258. See also Andrew E. Taslitz, The Criminal Republic: Democratic Breakdown as a Cause of
Mass Incarceration, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 133, 169 (2011) (describing the “array of relatively cheap informal
means: protests, vigils, strikes, ad hoc rallies, and unexpected visits to legislators’ offices” available to the public
to protest police activity).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol53/iss2/21

2

Miller: Breaking Windows as Corrective Justice: Impure Resistance in Urba
MILLER, BOOK REVIEW_FINAL (313) (CORRECTED) (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

BREAKING WINDOWS AS CORRECTIVE JUSTICE

3/5/2018 10:22 AM

315

legal, and political circumstances.
In this short review, I shall briefly consider Shelby’s identification of some core
features constitutive of a ghetto, and then the distinctive justice-based approach he takes
to evaluating the continued existence of ghettos, before concluding with some remarks on
the nature and success of his moral and political project.
RACIAL GHETTOS
Ghettos—metropolitan neighborhoods that significantly undermine the conditions
in which individuals can flourish as equal members of the political community—should
not exist. They should never have existed and must be eradicated as soon as possible. 9
Shelby targets “dark ghettos”: places in which African Americans are both segregated on
the basis of race and clustered in communities of “concentrated disadvantage.”10 These
segregated and disadvantaged communities are ones whose populations, instead of
flourishing, are congenitally depressed along multiple indices of well-being. Clustered
disadvantage in ghettos imperils the residents’ health, safety, education, and employment
prospects, and more generally undermines their liberty and freedom of association, social
equality, and economic fairness.11
If racial ghettos ought not exist, as a normative matter, then we ought not be satisfied
with technocratic and consequentialist solutions to the “problem” of the ghetto that stop
short of ending it. Tolerating ghettos requires either ignoring the question of their
continued existence or justifying it. The former approach, which Shelby calls the “medical
model,” is narrowly targeted towards technocratic values such as efficiency in identifying
and delivering services designed to ameliorate the social, economic, and cultural
conditions of ghetto residents. 12 But the medical model, by ignoring the question of the
continued existence of the ghetto, does not challenge the underlying structure of the society
that produced the ghetto, but perpetuates it. Just as bad, the medical model (like the
Ferguson police officer) treats ghetto residents as passive recipients of aid, rather than
active participants in the polity and the project of resisting injustice. Both failures tend to
encourage depictions of ghetto residents as pathological to the extent that they fail to live
up to dominant social norms.13
The underlying problem, then, is how a liberal polity, one that adheres to concepts
of both basic justice and a system of fair cooperation among its members, can contain
ghettos. In failing to eradicate ghettos, American society is, Shelby implies, a society that
tolerates injustice and unfair exploitation of some of its members. Those outside the ghetto
participate in injustice to the extent that they do not promote a corrective-justice response:
eradicating these racially segregated ghettos. Needless to say, that conclusion is likely to
prove uncomfortable, especially as it leads through a series of further arguments to the
conclusion that on occasion we do not have standing, in justice, to condemn the protests
of people like Edward Crawford.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

SHELBY, supra note 1, at 275.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 40–41, 67.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 14.
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ASYMMETRIC POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS

Shelby’s argument depends upon the distinction between our civic and natural
obligations. Civic obligations derive from reciprocity; natural obligations do not. They
derive from the bundles of rights that define our basic or non-social moral standing.
Natural obligations, including many of the obligations of justice, thus stand apart from and
beyond our civic obligations, though natural obligations may be enforced by our civic
institutions.
Shelby’s claim is that the normative illegitimacy of the ghetto—the fact that, in
justice, they ought not exist—relieves ghetto residents of their civic obligations, though
not their natural justice based ones. So certain types of non-violent criminal activity, such
as protesting, resisting arrest, but also recreational drug use or shoplifting, may be
permissible to remedy society’s failure to provide jobs and services (such as transportation,
healthcare, meaningful educational opportunities, and so on necessary for employment
opportunities). Other criminal acts, such as violent assaults, may be prohibited because
they violate natural justice, even if they do not breach civic duties. A weaker version of
Shelby’s argument is that those who tolerate the existence of these ghettos, through their
malign neglect of these social institutions, 14 have an under-acknowledged moral hand in
perpetrating injustice and are estopped from using arguments based on civic duties to
critique law-breaking activities of ghetto residents. These two arguments are not mutually
inconsistent: some forms of resistance may be fully permitted, because civic norms do not
apply, where others may be impermissible but not punishable, because those who would
cast penal judgment lack civic standing to do so.
Civic obligations are social and reciprocal. Shelby reaches this conclusion by
starting with the claim that society is a system of social cooperation over time. Social
cooperation entails that each member of a given society makes demands of the others to
participate in that society’s shared public goals. Every society provides a set of political
institutions that oversee this system of cooperation, and which promulgate and enforce
various rules and principles that underpin association of its members. Under this system
of cooperation, we can make demands on others, and they can make demands on us. 15
That system is more or less fair based on the distribution of rights and duties among
the members of that society. The system is fairer when everyone does their part and when
everyone has a chance to participate in guiding those institutions that set the terms of
cooperation. It is less fair when some shirk their duties or reap benefits that are
disproportionate in comparison to their contribution, or when some are (consistently)
excluded from participating in setting the terms of cooperation. One way in which society
is less fair is when it precludes people from participating on the basis of race, gender, class,
and so on.16
The system of reciprocity, however, entails an asymmetry when individuals fail to
uphold their side of the social compact. People who do not work, who have families in
circumstances that require others to participate in supporting the children, and who commit

14. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1996).
15. SHELBY, supra note 1, at 213.
16. Id. at 35.
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crimes are shirking their fair share and unfairly benefiting off of the rest of society. 17 As
a result, we have no obligation to support them and often an obligation to condemn or
punish shirkers. One justification advanced for tolerating the ghetto is that those who
reside within are people who fail to assimilate to the core cultural, moral, and political
norms or “bourgeois values” of American society and who unjustly burden the rest of us
with their bad behavior.18 Unless they uphold their end of the bargain, this argument
claims, these shirkers have no moral standing to demand that we ameliorate their
disadvantaged condition.
The core claim of Dark Ghettos is that the usual asymmetry does not apply and is in
fact reversed. The existence of ghettos does not reveal the moral failure or political
impotence of ghetto residents. Instead, Shelby advances the striking argument that
American society is so unjust and oppressive of those at the bottom that the usual bonds
of reciprocity fall away and the asymmetry flips. The marginalized and victimized are
justifiably antagonistic to those unfair rules, laws, and social norms that marginalize and
victimize them. In an unjust system, however, the failure to comply with formal and
informal social norms is not necessarily a form of shirking, but often a form of resistance—
even if poorly and “impurely” expressed—to an unfair social order and its goals and
rules.19
The usual view is that urban ghettos are chaotic places in which moral and political
values are unable to gain much traction. The technocratic response envisages what I have
elsewhere called (following David Garland) “responsibilization”: 20 placing the onus on
individuals to reform their character and conduct, rather than emphasizing the
responsibility of the state for creating (through Jim Crow) and maintaining these
segregated and disadvantaged communities.21 Once again, the attitude of those who
advocate responsibilization is like that of the police officer. The state (and its well-off or
“civilized” members) is thoroughly implicated in producing the conditions of injustice that
render abject the circumstances of the ghetto resident. Nonetheless, the ghetto resident is
supposed to comply with the values and ideologies that oppress her rather than challenge
them (however piecemeal and inexpertly). As Shelby argues, this approach requires not
only material injustice, but also the sort of self-abnegation destructive of self-respect.22
Instead of regarding poor, urban, minority neighborhoods as disconnected from
political mobilization and lacking political agents and agency, Shelby challenges us to
regard these “dark ghettos” as hotbeds of political activity organized around resisting
injustice. Given the limited social capital and ability to mobilize, these locations provide
few options for political expression. Since these are limited and oppositional expressions
of resistance, we should not expect them to fit dominant or mainstream standards for

17. Id. at 119.
18. Amy Wax & Larry Alexander, Paying the Price for Breakdown of the Country’s Bourgeois Culture,
PHIL. INQUIRER (Aug. 9, 2017), http://www.philly.com/philly/opinion/commentary/paying-the-price-forbreakdown-of-the-countrys-bourgeois-culture-20170809.html.
19. SHELBY, supra note 1, at 257–58.
20. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
124 (2001).
21. Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 417, 425 (2009).
22. SHELBY, supra note 1, at 220.
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political activity. In fact, that may be the point. Since mainstream society and its ideology
of working, two-parent households provides mostly demeaning options to ghetto residents,
it is not reasonable, Shelby thinks, to demand that ghetto residents abide by demands to
work in the legal economy, or to respect the structure of family life promoted by the middle
classes. To do so would be to forgo self-respect in the face of injustice. Given the
prevailing conditions of American society, justice permits—and may even require—
residents of African American urban ghettos to refuse the menial work available to them,
to engage in loving and procreative relationships, and to disobey certain criminal laws.
Communities manifest social and political domination, not merely by perpetuating
conditions of severe social deprivation, but also by limiting the acceptable ways in which
socially deprived individuals can express their dissatisfaction with, or resistance to, their
lot. We perpetuate a deeply unjust social order to the extent we characterize ghettos and
their residents as deviant and treat their acts of resistance as incomprehensible or
impermissible because they are not channeled through politically or culturally sanctioned
institutions. These dominative attitudes of disregard or disrespect fail to acknowledge the
ways in which official modes of protest often undermine the ghetto resident’s ability to
resist and instead reinscribe subordination and injustice as a condition of challenging it. 23
Acts of resistance can be big or small, clear or confused. For ghetto residents, the
difficulties of organizing effective political resistance may be complex or insurmountable,
and so their political speech may be “impure,” sending multiple mixed messages. That is
the lesson of Edward Crawford’s act of throwing a tear gas canister. Sometimes, broken
windows reflect the unfairness of the state’s toleration of deep injustice and social
deprivation, not just the lawlessness of some urban community. 24 In the circumstances,
throwing a gas cannister was the best Crawford could do to express his justified resentment
of the police. Our goal should be to recognize these acts as public political expressions and
judge them as such. Even in manifestly unjust societies, we are not bereft of standards to
criticize such conduct: though we may lack civic reciprocity as a ground of criticism, basic
justice remains.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Shelby’s book, as a whole, is a remarkable achievement. His is not an argument for
lawlessness or indolence. It is a scathing critique of the status quo, a statement of the deep
measure of injustice in American society, and a denial that we can responsibly make
reciprocity-based demands upon our fellow citizens when we refuse to provide them the
means to flourish.

23. For a recent exposé of the criminal justice system’s participation in race and class-based subordination,
see NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN AMERICA’S LARGEST
CRIMINAL COURT (2016) (describing the ways in which prosecutors, judges, defenders, and other officers of the
court perpetuate systemic racism in the Chicago, Illinois court system).
24. Compare George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, 29–38 (arguing that tolerating urban blight and low-level disorder can
lead to higher levels of criminal activity), with Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and
Social Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173 (2008) (arguing
that the sort of “broken windows” policing and incarcerative punishment associated with targeting low-level
crime weakens social bonds and produces increased criminal activity).
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The sheer volume of arguments that Shelby amasses is impressive, but at times
overwhelming. Because Shelby seeks to respond comprehensively to arguments that
ghetto residents deserve their fate, the book sometimes appears as a list of objections to be
briefly, if decisively, refuted.
However, Shelby’s method also reinforces his bigger theme: the best way to think
of Black ghettos is in terms of arguments about justice. If the goal is simply to show that
the justice perspective applies to the circumstances of the ghetto, then he succeeds
overwhelmingly. If the goal is to provide a roadmap to the justice-based arguments social
justice advocates should develop in support of public action to resist the perpetuation of
ghettos and the oppression of their residents, again, Shelby’s book is a remarkable success.
But the core ideas of injustice, civic reciprocity, and solidarity are expounded and
developed through a point-by-point refutation of various opponents’ arguments, and this
may leave readers wanting a more detailed discussion of some of the opposing arguments
in response to which Shelby refines his arguments. However, that is not necessarily a
criticism of the book; one way to take the book is as a challenge to further development
on each of the battlefronts it opens against those who would unfairly disparage ghettos and
their residents. Extending the arguments Shelby outlines may, in fact, be one way in which
we can admit our complicity in the continued existence of the ghetto, and express our
solidarity with ghetto residents by pursuing his project of corrective justice.
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